Minsk Ceasefire Agreement

After the follow-up memorandum, the second battle broke out at Donetsk airport and both sides continued to accuse each other of ceasefire violations. [4] At the end of October, DPR Prime Minister and Minsk protocol signatory Alexander Zakhartchenko said that his troops would retake territory it had lost to Ukrainian forces during an offensive in July 2014, and that DPR troops would be prepared to wage “heavy battles” to do so. [4] [13] Zakharchenko later said that he had been mis-quoted and that he meant that these territories were occupied by “peaceful means”. [14] While campaigning on the eve of the 2 November elections, organised by the DPR and the LPR in violation of protocol, Zakharchenko said: “These are historic times. We are creating a new country! He`s a crazy target. [15] OSCE President Didier Burkhalter confirmed that the elections were “at odds with the letter and spirit of the Minsk Protocol” and said they would “make their implementation even more difficult.” [16] The Ukrainian President at the time, Poroshenko, did not want to make political concessions to the separatists without an appropriate ceasefire. As a result, the Minsk 2 agreement was never fully implemented. But Poroshenko`s successor, Wolodymyr Zelenskiy, has pledged to finally implement the peace agreement. It is precisely because Minsk-2 reflects this impasse on the battlefield that it is a document by nature contradictory. As has already been said, the agreement subordinates the return of the border with Ukrainian control to a political settlement acceptable to Russia and its deputies. However, it also contains provisions that promote the restoration of Ukrainian control of the Donbass before an agreement is reached. Articles 1 and 2 provide for a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the contact line before a dialogue on elections. Article 4 does not know whether the dialogue begins the day after the withdrawal begins or the day after the closing; Ukraine can credibly state that the withdrawal of heavy weapons must be completed before preparations begin. More importantly, Russia is withdrawing its troops, 63 Russia has strengthened the armed formations of the DNR/NRL and strengthened their control over them, so that they now attach themselves effectively to its own military.64 Together, these circumstances prevent the holding of elections in the Donbass in accordance with OSCE/BDIM standards, as stipulated in Article 12.

On April 18, 2016, the scheduled municipal elections (organized by the DPR and LPR) were postponed from April 20 to July 24, 2016. [74] On 22 July 2016, these DPR and LPR elections were again postponed until 6 November 2016. [75] On October 2, 2016, the DPR and LPR held “primaries” in which voters nominated candidates for the November 6, 2016 elections. [76] Ukraine has condemned these “primaries” as illegal. [76] On November 4, 2016, both DPR and LPR postponed their municipal elections “until further notice”; The head of the DPR, Mr Zakhartchenko, added: “In 2017, we will hold elections under the Minsk agreements, or we will hold them independently.” [Citation required] The full text of the agreement is as follows:[44][45] The Ukrainian Parliament approved on 17 March a law on the “special status” of the Donbass, as defined in Minsk II. [56] Later, in 2019, the Ukrainian Parliament voted on Thursday to extend the rules that provide for limited autonomy to separatist-controlled eastern regions, a precondition for an agreement to resolve the five-year conflict there. [57] The law was immediately criticized by Ukrainian politicians, separatist leaders and the Russian government.